Questions and Requests by Johnson, Marion R.
OSU WPL 21 .145-152 (1976) 
Questions and Requests 
Marion R. Johnson 
l, It has been suggested by some linguists (e.g. Ross (1970: footnote 
19), Gordon and Lakoff (1971)) that pairs of sentences such as (1) and 
(2) bel-0w are syntactically derived from the same logical structure. 
(l) Where is John? 
(2) Tell me where John is. 
Under such an analysis, both (l) and (2) would be derived from a 
structure something like: {REQUEST, I, you (TELL, you, me, (BE, John, 
WHere))). 1 In the derivation of (l), the rule deleting the performative 
predicate REQUEST would be followed by a rule deleting TELL and 
effecting subject-verb inve,·sion. The import of such a claim is that 
(1) and (2) have the same illocutionary force, (1) being in effect an 
el.liptical form of (2). The purpose of this paper is to show that (1) 
and (2) are ,!!.2i equivalent in their structure as speech acts. I will 
argue that formal and pragmatic properties require that we recognize 
questions as a distinct category of speech acts, not as a subcategory 
of requests . 
An alternative proposal for analyzing the performative structure 
of questions vis-a-vis requests is presented in Sadock (1972, 1974) . 
Sadock rejects the idea •hat the performative predicate ASK can be 
reduced to the complex predicate REQUEST-TELL. He argues that true 
questions (that is, information-seeking questions) have the illocutionary 
force of asking, while what he calls requestions have the separate 
illocutionary force of requesting to tell, According to Sadock (1972: 
337), 'The main distinguishing characteristic is that in the re-
question, the speaker is only interested in the act of telling but in 
the true question, the speaker is interested in the content of the 
answer'. Sadock' s analysis makes all sentences such as (l) above 
ambiguous between these two possible i llocutionary forces . However, 
I find the evidence for this distinction unconvincing. A further 
goal of this paper, therefore, will be to show that interrogative 
structures in English have ~ambiguously the illocutionary force of en 
atomic predicate ASK, 
To simplify the discussion, I will ignore the problem of the 
'rhetorical question' and its relationship to acts of questioning that 
are genuine attempts to elicit information. Example sentences will be 
treated as if they belonged to a context which did not imply their 
answer before the addressee had had a chance to reply, 
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2 . The:e are two problems in deciding whether the underlying structure 
of (l) is the same as that of (2). The first is determining whether 
the element TELL is present in the structure of {l), and the second is 
deciding whether REQUEST is an adequate representation of the illocu-
tionary force of both (1) and (2). 
The absence of TELL is demonstrated by the impossibility of 
continuing (1) with any adverb or adverbial clause referring to TELL. 
Thus, (2a) and (3a) below are unacceptable because of their 'dangling 
adverbials', whereas (2b) and (3b) are well formed. 
(2) a. *Where is John tomorrow? 
b. Tell me where John is tomorrow. /Tell me 
tomorrow... 
(3) a. *Where is John, so that Mary will believe you're 
smart . 
b. Tell me where John is, so that Mary will believe 
you're smart. 
In true cases of verb deletion, it is still possible for adverbs to 
refer to them. Consider, for example, (4a) and (4b). 
( 4) a. John lives to play tennis, and George to swim. 
b. John arrived at seven, and George at seven-thirty. 
The presence of ' deleted verbs' in the logical structures of (4a) and 
(4b) is plausible because these deletions are recoverable . The 
proposed deletion in (1) is not. 
Another argument against the presence of TELL in the underlying 
structure of (1) concerns the surface verb ask. If ask could be 
decomposed as REQUEST-TELL, we would expect that the negation of ask 
would have ambiguous scope. This is not the case , as (5a)-(5c) show . 
(5a) corresponds in meaning to (5b) alone, and not to (5c). 
(5) a. I'm not asking you where John is. 
b. I 'm not requesting that you tell me where John is. 
c . I ' m requesting that you not tell me where John is. 
The paraphrase relations among (5a)- (5c) indicate that although ask 
as a unit can be paraphrased by a construction containing reauest-tell, 
the two constructions do not have equivalent internal structure. 
3 . The fact that questions and requests do not have the same 
illocutionary force can be demonstrated in several ways. First, they 
cannot be conjoined by and. (6a), which contains a question conjoined 
with a request, is ill formed, although (6b), where both members of 
the conjunction clearly have the same illocutiona:ry force, is acceptable . 
(6) a. ?Where is John, and hand me the phone- book . 
b. Tell me where John is , and hand me the phone- book. 
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Note that when a request is conjoined with an assertion, as in (6c), 
the result is also ill formed. 
(6) c. *Tell me where John is , and I met his sister last 
night . 
In a conjunction of this type, the illocutionar-3 force of each member 
must be the Sallie. This provides strong evidence that questions and 
reques~s are not the same category of speech act. 
Another reason for considering the force of asking to be different 
from that of requesting concerns the distribution of the politeness 
marker please. With requests, please is an extremely weak politeness 
device. Its occurrence is often so automatic and perfunctory that it 
need not sound odd or highly sarcastic even with i nherently rude 
requests, such as 'Shut up, please '. The perfunctoriness of olease 
extends to requests to tell, so that a sentence l i ke 'Tell me where 
John is, please ' does not require any special contextual factor to make 
i t appropriate . With a question, howeYer, the appropriat eness of please 
is considerably more restricted. With information-seeking questions , 
please is relatively strong as a politeness device, sig,ialling a social 
distance (frequently deferential) between speaker and addressee. For 
example, 'Where is John, please? ' would not be used in conversation 
between tvo close friends, but it might be used by someone initiating 
conversation with a stranger. Sadock (1974:121) attributes the use of 
please with questions to the fact that 'the asker has no personal 
stake in the response ' . But ther e are many situations in which please 
is likely to accompany a question, although it would be absurd to 
suppose that the questioner is feigning disinterest in the answer. 
For example, one might say to a salesclerk , ' How much does that one 
cost, please?', or to a stranger over the telephone, 'Is so- and-so 
there, please?', or to someone at an information booth, ' Where is the 
wash-room, please?' . The factors infl uencing the use of please in 
these cases include the impersonality of the social relationship , the 
desire to express a formal gesture of good will , and the uncertainty 
of the speaker that his addressee will cooperate conversationally with 
him. These aspects of please will be discussed in more detail below. 
At this point, I want only to establish that the interpretation of 
please is different with questions than with requests, and that this 
difference indicates a dilference in the category of speech act . 
Since a major argument for Sadock ' s question/requestion 
distinction is the supposed occurrence of please with requestions 
but not questions, it should be apparent how the foregoing refutes 
such a position . Two other arguments from Sadock require some comment. 
Sadock (1974:122) points out that expressions like in the world, 
in the hell, and so on 'in one common dialect can follow interrogative 
pronouns Just in case the speaker is interested in the further speci-
fication of that noun phrase' . This means that sentences like ' Where 
in the world is John?' can be used only as questions and not as 
requestions , according to Sadock's definition of these t erms . More-
oYer, in the world cannot co-occur with nlease, which is said to occur 
only with requestions. 
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I find the date. in this arglD!lent confusing. Se.dock seems to be 
saying that this use of in the world is distinct from its use to 
indicate exasperation or related emotions . That is, in the world. 
can merely express curiosity, without a further connotation of tension 
because the speaker feels that bis curiosity has been thus far 
thwarted. Even so, there is no problem in the tendency for such 
expressions to exclude please, since the expression of a personal 
feeling of curiosity is praginatical1y incompatible vith the goal of 
distancing the addressee. These co-occurrence restrictions show that 
lexical insertion is sensitive to a wide range of situational 
conditions. They do not show that the sentence 'Where in the world 
is John?' has a different illocutionary force from 'Where is John, 
please?'. 
A further argument from Se.dock is as follows. He points out 
that on a quiz show, a sentence like (7a) can be used with the same 
force as the question in (7b). 
(7) a. This ungainly-looking bird is the symbol of 
Louisiana. 
b. What u.~gainly- looking bird is the symbol of 
Louisiana? 
The point of this example is obscure. Obviously, the context of a 
quiz show supplies an implicit instruction to the addressee to give 
the name of the bird, having heard (Ta). However, (Ta) conveys this 
meaning in much the same way that an assertion like 'It's cold in 
here' conveys a request to close the window, given the right situational 
assumptions. The conveyed meaning depends upon special conditions that 
are unrelated .o tbe basic structure of tbe speech act. rn other 
words, tbe 'question' sense of (7a) is a perlocutionary effect, not 
a true indirect speech act. 
To return to the central problem of questions and requests, 
there is a tbird reasbn for considering these as distinct catf!gories 
of speech acts. The reason is that many idiomatic meanings attach 
themselves to questions, but not to the corresponding requests to 
tell. For example, in addition to its literal meaning as a question 
abont the state of someone ' s knowledge, (8a) can convey the embedded 
question 'Where is John?', or it can convey an offer to tell about 
2where John is (i.e. it can initiate a new topic in a conversation) . 
As a paraphrase, (8b) corresponds only to the literal meaning of (8a) . 
(8) a. Do you know where John is? 
3b. Tell me if you know where John is . 
Similarly, (9a) can ask a question about someone ' s ability, or it can 
convey a request to close the window. (9b) paraphrases only the first, 
the literal, meaning of (9a). 
(9) a. Can you close the window? 
b. Tell me if you can close the window. 
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I f (8a) and (9a) were derived from the same source as (8b) and (9b} 
respectively, it wouJ.d be necessary to say that the idiomatic meanings 
enter in the cours€ of the derivation, after the application of the 
rule deleting tell. Obviously, this is unacceptable, because it 
would mean that the meaning of an utterance, including its illocu-
tionary force, is not fully represented in its deep structure . 
Aiternatively, the rule deleting tell couJ.d be constrained to apply 
obligatorily in the presence of certain idiomatic meanings. This 
solution provides nothing more than an ad hoc label for an unsolved 
problem. Recognizing that questions have an illocutionary force of 
t heir own seems to me the necessary first step toward accounting for 
the possible illocutionary extensions of their use, extensions which 
do not apply to paraphrases beginning 'Tell me ... '. 
4. Without presuming to give a complete or philosophical account of 
questions, I would like to add here a few comments on the structure 
of questions as a speech act type, and how they differ systematically 
from requests. These comments should point, in turn, toward an explana-
tion of the formal differences which have just been described. 
The crucial difference between questions and requests lies in a 
rather obvious fact,namely, a request mentions explicitly what action 
the speaker intends as an appropriate response to his speech act, 
whereas a question conveys implicitly what constitutes the appropriate 
next move by the addressee. This means that the range of response 
types that can be elicited by a request is indefinitely large, but the 
range of response types to questions is quite small and inflexible. 
A request can directly elicit virtually any action describable by 
language, including various kinds of speech acts. A question, however, 
direct ly elicits only its answer, which most often will be an act of 
asserting, although i t can also be an act of showing (for example, 
pointing a finger). 
The flexibility of request structures shows up, for example, i n 
the possibility 0£ embedding a request for some action within a request 
to pursue some larger goal, to which the action is instrumental. For 
example, (10) is primarily a request to let the speaker die happy, 
(10) Tell me where John is so that I can die happy . 
and only secondarily (or rather, instrumentally), a request to tell 
something. On the other hand, it is possible to make a primary request 
to tell, while ment ioning in addition the best possible means, as in 
(ll}. 
(ll) Tell me where John is, by wriggling your ears in his 
direction. 
(cf.: Wriggle your ears in John's direction, so that 
I' ll know where he is.) 
None of this flexibility is available within the structure of a question, 
as the unacceptable sentences below show. 
(10) a. *Where is John, so that I can die happy? 
(ll) a. ~Where is John, by wriggling your ears in his 
direction? 
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It is not possible to add to the instructions implicitly attached to 
a question within the structure of the question itself. A request, 
in contrast , is not circumscribed by any set of appropriate responses 
that are understood prior to the act of requesting itself. 
Another way in which this difference shows up is that questions 
reject time adverbials, but requests do not . For example, 
(12) Five minutes from now, tell me where John is. 
a. *Five minutes from now, where is John? 
(13) Af'ter I wash the dishes, tell me where John is. 
a . *Af'ter I wash the dishes, where is John? 
The response to a request may be explicitly deferred by the speaker, 
because there is no standardized expectation concerning the appropriate 
time lapse between uptake of the request and action in response to it . 
In fact, no such standardized expectation based upon the speech act 
is possible, because the appropriate time lapse will depend strictly 
on the content of the request . In most conversational settings,4 
however, the answer to a question is expected immediately following 
uptake. In fact, answering is the normal sign of uptake; any response 
other than something that constitutes 'an answer' is a conversational 
non sequiter. If a speaker intends the answer to be deferred, he must 
explain this intention in an additional sentence. Otherwise, he will 
be understood as expecting some sort of reply as soon as his question 
has been asked. 
A further difference between questions and requests is that there 
is a distinct set of rules concerning when it is permissible to make a 
request, who may make one, which request-fonn is appropriate to a 
given situation, and so on; but the rules concerning when to ask a 
question are simply the rules concerning when to engage in conversation. 
As long as someone is willing to engage in cooperative conversation, 
then it will be understood that he is prepared to ask and answer 
questions.5 Please is used with questions precisely when this willing-
ness to cooperate conversationally is in doubt--for example, when 
initiating a conversation with a stranger. Please shows that the 
speaker does not intend to impose his attention on the addressee 
without his consent. As soon as a conversational rapport has been 
established, nlease becomes superfluous and its presence can onJ.y 
imply a lack of confidence in the other ' s good faith. 
In contrast to this, please is always appropriate with requests, 
because it is never understood on general conversational principles 
that the addressee will comply. There is always an implicit option 
within the structure of requesting to accept or decline. This shows 
up in the fact that in reply to a request like 'Tell me where John 
is', all of the following are possible: 'Yes (I will)', 'O.K.', 'All 
rig)lt', 'No', 'Never'. These particles refer to the speaker ' s 
willingness to comply. The corresponding sequences with a question, 
however, are nonsensical. For example: *'Where is John? Never.'. 
Thus, yes and no have a potential ambiguity with requests which does 
not exist with questions. In reply to the request, 'Tell me if John 
is in Halifax' ~ or £2. can mean either 'Yes, I will', 'No, I won ' t', 
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or 'Yes, he is', 'No, he isn ' t', respectively. This ambiguity does 
not exist in reply to the question 'Is John in Halifax?'. Yes and !:!2. 
in this case can only mean 'Yes, he is' and 'No, he isn't',--
respectively. 
5. In conclusion, I have argued i n this paper that we must r ecognize 
guestions and reguests as distinct classes of speech acts . The 
syntactic evidence for this distinction centers on the absence of a 
verbal predicate tell in the logical structure of questions, to which 
adverbs can refer ; the impossibility of conjoining requests with 
questions; the specialized distribution of please with quest ions ; and 
the existence of idiomatic meanings attached to questions, but not to 
the corresponding requests to tell. The question/request distinction 
is confirmed by the existence of general rules of conversation which 
govern (implicitly) the appropriate responses to questions, but not 
requests. Asking a question is different from making a request becaus~ 
the pattern of the interaction is understood independently of its 
content, and the basic pattern is correspondingly less flexible. 
Footnotes 
1such a representation would be assigned by supporters of the 
'performative analysis'. This paper is not necessarily intended to 
support t hat theoretical view. What is at issue is whether questi ons 
constitute a distinct illocutionary class, or merely a subcl ass of 
requests. The further question concerning how information about the 
illocutionary force of a sentence is to be represented will not be 
touched upon here . 
2These meanings are pointed out in Gordon and Lakoff (1971) :" 
3For (8b) to correspond in meaning to (8a), the if- clause of 
(8b) must be interpreted as the nominalized complement of tell, not 
as a n adverbial clause. 
4,Most conversational settings' is intended to exclude fundamental 
questions like ' Will you marry me?', where it may be understood in 
the context that the addressee is allowed to think about his response. 
51,1y notion of 'conversati onal cooperation' is, of course, that 
presented in Grice (1974). 
Questions whose content violates cultural taboos (e . g. 'How old 
are you?') are obviously still excluded. The same constraint will 
hold for assertions , so that this fact i s not related to the i ntrinsic 
structure of questioning. 
6orders are a special type of request characterized by the 
absence of this option. Even an order, however, invites the r epl y, 
'Yes, sir' or 'Yes, ma ' m', confirming the addressee' s acceptance of the 
order . What is special about or ders is the speaker and addressee ' s 
mutual realization that the reply 'No, sir' or 'No, ma ' m' , is socially 
unacceptable (i . e. not a genuine option). 
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